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Abstract
Quantum Cryptography is an emerging
technology in which two parties may
simultaneously
generate
shared,
secret
cryptographic key material using the transmission of quantum states of light. The security of
these transmissions is based on the inviolability of
the laws of quantum mechanics and information –
theoretically secure post- processing methods. An
adversary can neither successfully tap the
quantum transmissions, nor evade detection,
owing to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. In
this paper we describe the theory of quantum
cryptography and the most recent results from
our experimental free space system with which we
have demonstrated for the first time the feasibility
of quantum key generation over a point-to-point
outdoor atmospheric path in daylight. We
achieved a transmission distance of 0.5km which
was limited only by the length of the test range.
Our results provide strong evidence that
cryptographic key material could be generated on
the demand between a ground station and a
satellite (or between two satellites), allowing a
satellite to be securely re-keyed on orbit. We
present a feasibility analysis of surface-to-satellite
quantum key generation.
Keywords: Encryption and decryption, Data
transmission, Photon counting, Quantum Key
distribution and Uncertainty principle.

1. Introduction
Two of the main goals of cryptography (i.e.)
encryption and authentication of messages can be
accomplished with provable security if the sender
(“Alice”) and the recipient (“Bob”) posses a secret
random bit sequence known as key material. The
initial step of the key distribution in which the two



parties acquire the key material, must be accomplished with a high level of confidence that a third party
(“Eve”) cannot acquire even partial information
about the random bit sequence. If Alice and Bob
communi-cate solely through classical messages it is
impossible for them to generate a certifiably secret
key owing to the possibility of the passive
eavesdropping. However, secure key generation
becomes possible if they communicate with single
photon transmission using the emerging technology
of quantum cryptography, or more accurately the
quantum key distribution (QKD). [1]
The security of QKD is based on the inviolability of
the laws of quantum mechanics and provably secures
(information theoretic) public discussion protocols.
Eve can neither tap the key transmissions owing to
the indivisibility of quanta [2] nor copy them
faithfully because of the “quantum no cloning
theorem” [3]. At a deeper level, QKD resists
interception and retransmission by an eavesdropper
because in quantum mechanics, in the contrast to the
classical world the results of the measurement cannot
be thought of as revealing a “”possessed value” of the
quantum state. A unique aspect of quantum cryptography is that Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle
ensures that is Eve attempts to intercept and measure
Alice’s quantum transmissions, her activities must
produce an irreversible change in the quantum states
(i.e.) it collapses the wave function that are
retransmitted to Bob. These changes will introduce
an anomalously high error rate in the transmissions
between Alice and Bob, allowing them to detect the
attempted eavesdropping. In particular, from the
observed error rate Alice and Bob can put an upper
bound on any partial knowledge that an eavesdropper
may have acquired by monitoring their transmissions.
This bound allows the intended users to apply
conventional information theoretic technique by
public discussion to distill an error free, secret key.
Because it has the ultimate security assurance of a
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law of nature, quantum cryptography offers
potentially attractive ease of over advantages over
conventional key distribution schemes, it avoids the
insider threat because key material does not exists
before the quantum transmissions take place. It
replaces cumbersome conventional key distribution
methods whose security is based on physical security
of the distribution process; and it provides a secure
alternative to key distribution schemes based on
public key cryptography, which are potentially vulnerable to algorithmic advances and improved
computing techniques. Thus quantum key distribution enables encrypted communication on demand,
because it allows key generation at transmission time
over an unsecured optical communication link.

satellite-to-satellite and deep space communications.
The optical pointing, acquisition and tracking
techniques developed for laser communications could
be used to make QKD possible over line-of-sight
transmissions in free space [15, 16 and 17] provided
that signal-to-noise and bit rates adequate for
cryptographic applications can be achieved. There are
certain key distribution problems for which free
space QKD would have definite practical advantages.
For example, it is impractical to send a courier to a
satellite. We believe that free space QKD could be
used for key generation between a low earth orbit
satellite and a ground station [17] as well as in other
applications where laser communications are
possible.

The first quantum key distribution protocol
was published by Charles Bennett and Gilles
Brassard in 1984 and is now known as “BB84”. [4].
A further advance in the theoretical quantum
cryptography took place in 1991 when Ekert [5]
proposed that Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
entangles two particle states could be used to a
quantum cryptography protocol whose security was
based on Bell’s inequalities, Brassard and collaborators performed the first experimental demonstration of
QKD by constructing a working prototype system for
the BB84 protocol, using polarized photons [6].
Although the propagation distance was only 30cm,
this experiment is several ways still the most
thorough demonstration of quantum cryptography.
Potentially practical applications of QKD outside the
carefully controlled environment of a physics
laboratory are largely determined by the physics of
single photon production, the requirement of the
faithful transmission of the quantum states involved
the existence of high-efficiency single photon
detectors at the required wavelength and the
compatibility of QKD with existing optical
communication infrastructures. In 1992 Bennett
published a minimal QKD scheme “B92” and
proposed that it could be implemented using single
photon interference for long distance propagation
over optical fibers. [7]. since then, several
experimental groups [8, 9, 10, and 11] have
developed optical fiber- based QKD systems. For
example, at Los Alamos few scientists have
demonstrated the feasibility of low-error rate QKD
over underground optical fibers that were installed
for network applications [11]. They have previously
demonstrated QKD over 24km of fiber [12] and have
operated for over one year at an increased
propagation distance of 48 km [13]. In recent years
there have also been considerable developments in
the use of free space laser communication [14] for
high bandwidth terrestrial, surface-to-satellite,

To demonstrate this possibility we have
developed a free space QKD system for such
applications and have previously achieved a
transmission distance of 1km over a folded path at
night [17]. More recently, few scientists have
performed the first demonstration of free space QKD
over a point-to-point 0.5km path in daylight and
report these result here.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. In section 2 we give a concise introduction
to the theory of quantum cryptography. Then, in
section 3 we describe the experimental considerations
underlying their implementation of quantum
cryptography in our free space QKD system. In
section 4 we present a feasibility study of QKD
between a ground station and a satellite in low-earth
orbit. Finally, in section 5 we present some
conclusion.



2. Quantum Cryptography theory
To understand QKD we must first move
away from traditional key distribution method of
Alice sending particular key data to Bob. Instead, we
should have in mind a more symmetrical starting
point, in which Alice and Bob initially generate their
own independent random binary sequence,
containing more numbers than they need for the key
material that they will ultimately share. Through
public discussion they agree on QKD protocol by
which they can perform a bitwise comparison of their
sequences using a quantum transmission over a
quantum channel and a public discussion of the
results (over an authenticated public channel) to
distill a shared, random subsequence, which will
become the key material. It is important to appreciate
that they do not need to identify all of their shared
numbers, or even particular ones, because the only
requirements on the key material are that the numbers
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should be secret and random. Several QKD protocols
have been developed but for simplicity we shall
describe the minimal B92 QKD protocol [7] in terms
of the preparation and measurement of single photon
polarization states. (Cryptographically, the BB84
protocol has certain advantages, but the physics
issues involved are identical with B92.)
In the B92 QKD protocol Alice produce
photons with either of two non-orthogonal
polarizations: V or +450(say); and Bob can make
either of two complementary non- orthogonal
polarization measurements: 450 or H (say). Alice and
Bob generate their own independent sequences of
random bit numbers. Next, they proceed through their
sequence bit-by-bit in synchronization, with Alice
preparing a polarized photon for each of her bits
according to the rules:

Alice sends each photon over a “quantum channel” to
bob. (The quantum channel is a transmission medium
that isolated the quantum state from interactions with
the environment). Bob makes a polarization
measurement on each photon he receives, according
to the value of his bits as given by:

And records the result (“pass” = Y, “fail” = N). Note
that Bob will never record a “pass” (a false positive) if
his bit is different from Alice’s (they have crossed
polarizer’s). He only records a “pass” on 50% of the
bits that they have in common. In example of four bits
shown in figure 1,

We see that for the first and fourth bits Alice and
Bob had different values, so that Bob’s result is a
definite “fail” in each case. However, for the
second and third bits, Alice and Bob have the same
bit values and the protocol is such that there is a
probability of 0.5 that Bob’s result will be a “pass”



in each case. Of course, we cannot predict in any
particular experiment which one will be a “pass,”
but in this example the second bit was a “fail” and
the third bit was a “pass.”
To complete the protocol Bob sends a
copy of his (Y or N) results to Alice, but not the
measurement that he made on each bit. (It is at
this data-reconciliation stage that the initial key
material is required for authentication. This key
material can be replaced by a portion of the key
material generated by QKD.) He may send this
information over a conventional (public) channel
which may be subject to eavesdropping. Now
Alice and Bob retain only those bits for which
Bob’s result was “Y” and these bits become the
shared key material. (In the example of Figure 1
the third bit becomes the first bit of the shared
key.) An ideal B92 procedure distills on average
one shared bit from every four initial bits assuming
that there are no photon losses in transmission or
detection. The 25% efficiency, Q, of the idealized
QKD process is the price that Alice and Bob
must pay for secrecy. In a practical system,
additional losses in transmission (efficiency factor
T) and detection (efficiency factor D) will occur
(and can be tolerated). However, these losses only
affect the bit rate, not the security.
In a practical system there will be
errors in the reconciled data arising from
optical imperfections and detector noise, which
must be removed before the key material can be
used. Alice and Bob can remove these errors using
conventional error correcting codes over their
public channel, but at the expense of revealing
some (parity) information about the resulting key
material to Eve. Errors and information leakage
will also occur if Eve performs her own
measurement of Alice’s states on the quantum
channel and fabricates new photons to send on to
Bob. To take an extreme case, if Eve measures
each of Alice's photons using Alice’s basis she
will introduce a 25% error rate into Alice and
Bob’s key material, while correctly identifying
75% of Alice's bits. Of course, Alice and Bob
could readily detect such a large error rate and
would not then use their reconciled data for key
material, but the eavesdropper could still gain
some information e x p e n s e of a proportionately
smaller error rate if she only measures a fraction
of Alice's photons. It is the goal of quantum
cryptography for Alice and Bob to translate an
observed error rate into an upper bound on Eve's
knowledge of their reconciled data.[18] Such
bounds have been established for eavesdropping
attacks on individual bits[19] and are the subject of
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current research in the case of coherent attacks on
multiple bits. Error correction should then be
followed by a further stage of “privacy
amplification” to reduce any partial knowledge
acquired by Eve to less than one bit of the final
key string. [20] For example, Alice and Bob could
choose the parities of random subsets of their
error corrected data so that Eve will be forced to
have less than one bit of information about the
resulting key. These additional stages are
performed over the public channel.
Authentication of the public channel
transmissions is necessary to avoid a "man-inthe- middle" attack, in which Eve could gain
control of both the quantum and public channels,
allowing her to masquerade as Bob to Alice and
vice-versa. Alice a n d B o b w o u l d t h e n
unknowingly generate independent keys with Eve
who could use these keys to read all of their
subsequent encrypted communications. Alice and
Bob need a short, secret authentication key to
start the QKD procedure, and can replenish this
key with a small portion of the QKD material
generated. For authentication based on random
hashing they will need O (log2n) secret
authentication bits for every n-bit public
transmission. [21]
So from the foregoing, we see that a
QKD procedure may be broken down into the
following seven stages:
1.
Alice and bob acquire a secret
authentication key;
2.
Alice and Bob generate independent secret
sequences of random bits;
3.
Alice and Bob use quantum transmissions
of a QKD protocol to compare their sequences and
classical communications to identify a random
sequence of shared secret bits;
4.
Alice and Bob perform an error correction
procedure on the data;
5.
Alice and Bob assess how much knowledge
Eve may be acquired;
6.
Alice and Bob perform an appropriate
privacy amplification procedure over the public
channel;
7.
Part of the resulting key material is used to
replenish the authentication in step 1 so that the
system is ready for the next key generation session.
The result of these steps is a shared,
error-free secret key. (It has been proposed that
the key bits generated by QKD should be used
for the encryption of communications using the



unbreakable “one-time pad” method. [22] However,
the key material could equally well, and more
practically, be used by Alice and Bob in any other
symmetric key cryptosystem.) Of the steps above,
only one (step 3) involves the experimental
physics issues that will be crucial to the
practical feasibility of QKD. In our work we
have therefore focused our efforts on this
component of QKD. A fully functional key
generation system would include careful
implementation of the other steps, but these (with
the exception of step 5) are better understood and
may be readily incorporated once step 3 has been
adequately demonstrated. Step 5 relates to the
physics of eavesdropping and a full treatment of
this topic is beyond the scope of this paper. We
will therefore limit ourselves to a few additional
remarks on this subject.
In the simple form described above, the
B92 protocol is vulnerable to Eve measuring
Alice’s photons in Bob's basis and only sending
on those photons she can identify. (A "Bob's
basis" attack.) This will cause a factor of four
reductions in bit rate unless Eve sends out multiple
photons instead of just one. Alice and Bob can
protect against this type of attack if Bob is able to
detect the photon number of the received bits, as in
our system described below. They could also avoid
this problem entirely by using the BB84 protocol,
which uses four states instead of two. However,
from the perspective of the physics, the B92 and
BB84 protocols are so similar that BB84 will also
be possible under conditions for which QKD with
the B92 protocol is feasible.
In considering possible eavesdropping on a QKD
system it also important to distinguish between
attacks that are possible with existing technology,
which are limited to individual bit attacks, and
potential future attacks that are limited only by the
laws of physics. In particular, current QKD
experiments use approximate single-photon states
that are obtained by attenuating the output of a
pulsed laser so that the average photon number per
pulse is less than one. Such pulses contain a
Poisson distribution of photon numbers, and the
low intensity is necessary to ensure that very few
pulses are vulnerable to an eavesdropper using an
optical beam splitter to “tap out” a photon from
pulses containing more than one photon. Present
QKD system can be made secure against such
attacks by appropriate use of privacy amplification.
However, as quantum-optical technology advances
an eavesdropper could use more sophisticated
methods to attack such a system in the future, as we
will discuss below. Before such attacks become
possible it will be important for Alice and Bob to
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replace their weak laser pulse QKD source with a
true single-photon light source. Several techniques
are now becoming feasible for producing such states
of light. A demonstration of the feasibility of QKD
with weak laser pulses also implies the viability of
QKD with a true single-photon light source under
the same experimental conditions, because of the
linearity of the processes involved.

3. Experiment point to point quantum key
generation over 0.5km in daylight
The success of QKD over free-space
optical paths depends on the transmission and
detection of single optical photons against a high
background through a turbulent medium. Although
these are challenging problems they can be overcome
with careful choices of experimental parameters and
the use of various optical techniques developed for
laser communications. The atmosphere has a high
transmission “window” for light with a wavelength
in the vicinity of 770 nm. Photons can be readily
produced at this wavelength with rugged, lowpower semiconductor lasers and their polarization
properties controlled with off-the-shelf optical.
Furthermore,
commercial
s i n g l e -photon
c o u n t i n g m o d u l e s ( SPCMs) a r e n o w
available that can count such photons with
efficiencies as high as D ~ 65% at rates of up to 1
MHz, with dark count rates as low as 50 Hz. The
atmosphere is essentially non-birefringent at
These wavelengths and so will allow the faithful
transmission of the QKD polarization states.
However, atmospheric turbulence will introduce
both photon arrival time jitter and beam wander
(through variations in refractive index). The slow
turbulence time-scales involved (0.1s to 0.01s)
allow the jitter to be compensated by transmitting
a bright timing laser pulse (which carries no key
information) at a different wavelength a short time
(100 ns, say) before each QKD photon. The arrival
of this bright pulse at the receiver allows a definite
timing window to be imposed for the single QKD
photon’s arrival, because the atmospheric
transmission time will not have changed over the
intervening short interval. Beam wander caused by
atmospheric turbulence reduces the QKD bit rate,
but as we will see later is not a critical limitation on
surface-to-satellite paths even if left uncontrolled.
However, active beam steering (“tip-tilt” control)
methods
have been developed for laser
communications to keep the beam directed onto the
receiver. For example, by monitoring a reflected
component of the bright timing pulse, an error



signal can be derived and feedback to a beamsteering mechanism.
At first sight a more serious concern is that
the large background of photons from the sun (or
even the moon at night) could swamp the singlephoton QKD signal. However, as we will see below,
a combination of (sub)-nanosecond timing, narrow
wavelength filters [23, 24] and a small solid angle
for photon acceptance (spatial filtering) at the
receiver [16] can render this background tractable.
The QKD transmitter (“Alice”) in our system
contains a 1-MHz clock that synchronizes the
various events (see figure 2)

On each “tick” of the clock a ~ 1-ns optical
“bright pulse” is produced from a “timing-pulse”
laser operating at a wavelength of ~ 768 nm. After
a ~100-ns delay one of two temperature- controlled
“data” diode lasers emits a ~ 1-ns optical pulse that
is attenuated to the single-photon level and
constrained by interference filters to a wavelength of
773.0 0.5 nm. The polarization of the optical pulse
from each laser is set to one of the two nonorthogonal settings required for the B92 protocol.
The choice of which data laser fires is determined
by a random bit value that is obtained by
discriminating electrical noise. The random bit value
is indexed by the clock tick and recorded in a
computer control system’s memory. All three
optical pulse paths are combined (using beam
splitters, BS), directed into a single-mode (SM)
optical fiber for delivery to a transmitting
telescope, and emitted towards Bob’s receiver. The
process is then repeated one microsecond later with
the next random bit, and so on.
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At Bob’s QKD receiver the light pulses
are collected by a 3.5-inch diameter Cassegrain
telescope and directed into a polarization analysis
and detection system. (See Figure 3.)

The bright pulse triggers an avalanche photodiode
detector, and this event sets up an electronic timing
“window” about 5-ns long in which a QKD optical
data pulse is expected. After emerging from the
collection telescope, an optical data pulse
encounters an optical beam splitter at which a
single-photon would be either transmitted or
reflected with equal probabilities. We use this
quantum-mechanically random behavior at the
beam splitter to perform Bob’s random choice of
which B92 polarization measurement is made on the
arriving optical data pulse. Along the transmitted
path, an optical data pulse’s polarization is
analyzed according to Bob’s B92 “0”
Value, while along the reflected path a measurement
for H-polarization is made using a polarizing beam
splitter (PBS). (The PBS transmits H- but reflects
V-polarization.) After each polarization analysis
stage, optical data pulses pass through interference
filters matched to those in the transmitter, and are
collected into (spatial filtering) multi-mode
optical fibers for delivery to single-photon
counting modules (SPCMs), one for each bit
value. Of course, for many of the arriving bright
pulses there will be no corresponding single-photon
detection owing to the efficiency of the B92
protocol, the attenuation experienced by the optical
data pulses, and the SPCM’s detection efficiency.
For events on which one of the two SPCMs
triggers, Bob can assign a bit value to Alice’s
transmitted bit. He records these detected bits in



the memory of a computer control system, indexed
by the “bright pulse” clock tick. Subsequently,
Bob’s computer control system transmits a file of
index values (but not the corresponding bit values)
to Alice over a wireless Ethernet link. Alice and
Bob then use those detected bits as the raw bit
sequences from which an error-free, secret key is
distilled using further communications over the
Ethernet channel.
The QKD system was operated for several
days over a 0.5-km horizontal outdoors atmospheric
range from west (transmitter) to east (receiver) under
daylight and nighttime conditions. A typical sample
of 256 bits identified from 50,000 initial bits under
daylight conditions on November 19, 1998 at
4.30pm, is shown in Figure 4, with Alice’s bit value
marked as “A” and Bob’s as “B”.

The above data set contains 5 errors
(marked in bold type) and the bit error rate (BER)
observed in the whole data set was approximately
1.6%. This would be regarded as unacceptably high
in any conventional telecommunications application,
but can be tolerated in QKD because of the secrecy
of the bits. The effectiveness of our precise timing,
wavelength and spatial filtering techniques for
mitigating daylight background photon events is
shown by the measured background rate of 1 event
per 50,000 detector triggers, contributing only
approximately 0.4% to the BER. Detector dark
noise makes an even smaller contribution of
approximately 0.1% to the BER. We conclude that
the dominant contribution to the BER is from
optical misalignment and intrinsic imperfections of
the polarizing elements.
Clearly, errors must be removed before
the bit strings can be used as key material. An
efficient, interactive error correction procedure has
been invented that can remove all errors from such
data sets, with BERs of up to 15%.[25] However,
for simplicity in our system we perform a twodimensional block-parity error correction procedure
over the Ethernet channel, which requires Alice to
reveal some parity data about the bit strings. An
eavesdropper could combine this information with
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any knowledge acquired through eavesdropping on
the quantum transmissions. There are two ways of
dealing with this issue. Alice and Bob could
encrypt the parity information, which would
require them to have more secret bits initially, or
they could perform additional privacy amplification
to compensate for the information revealed, which
would produce a shorter key string. We perform a
rudimentary privacy amplification procedure by
dropping one row and one column from each
matrix of data bits. A fully functional QKD
system would incorporate a more sophisticated
privacy amplification procedure.
The ~ 5-kHz key rate is adequate for the
one-time pad encryption of small image files that
we have incorporated into our software control
system. Because the one-time pad method requires
as many key bits as message bits, the key rate
would not be adequate for more lengthy
transmissions. This key rate would be acceptable
and better used for generating session keys for use
in other symmetric key cryptosystems because such
keys need only be a few hundred bits in length.
The average photon number per optical
data pulse for this data set was ~ 0.3, giving a
probability of 22% that the pulse contains exactly
one photon, and a probability of 25.9% that a pulse
contains at least one photon. Thus, approximately
15% of the detectable pulses contain more than one
photon. (Such multi-photon pulses can trigger both
of Bob’s SPCMs, but the rate for these “dual fire”
errors is reduced below the key rate by the product of
the BER and the multi- photon emission probability.
We observed no dual fires in the entire 50-k bit
sequence leading to the data in Figure 4. By
monitoring the dual-fire rate, Alice and Bob could
protect against the “Bob’s basis” attack outlined in
Section 2.) So, a full security analysis of our system
must take into account the possibility of Eve
performing a beam splitting attack to “tap off” the
occasional photon from two-photon pulses. (See ref.
[17] for an analysis of this type of attack.) With
appropriate privacy amplification procedures our
system can be rendered secure against this and other
individual bit attacks that are possible with existing
technology. However, in the future a system such as
ours could become vulnerable to a so-called QND
attack, [26, and 18] in which Eve uses a quantum
non-demolition (QND) measurement to identify
those pulses containing two photons. She could then
determine Alice's bit value on these pulses,



suppress the other pulses, and transmit a new
photon to Bob, using a hypothetical lossless
channel. Because Alice's two- photon emission rate
is larger than Bob's detection rate in our system,
Bob would not notice a reduction in bit rate in this
type of attack. Although the QND attack is not
feasible today, this possibility should not be ignored.
We plan eventually to remove this potential
vulnerability by using a true single-photon light
source instead of a weak pulsed laser source.

4. Quantum key distribution to satellites
Our proof-of-concept QKD demonstrations
over horizontal terrestrial paths provide strong
evidence that surface-to-satellite QKD will be
possible. This is because the optical influence of
turbulence is the major hurdle to be overcome in
surface-to-satellite QKD, and the turbulent effects
occur predominantly within the lowest 2 km
atmosphere. Ground-to- satellite, satellite-to-ground
and satellite-to-satellite QKD should all be
possible, for both low- earth orbit (LEO) and
geostationary satellites. For illustration we will
here estimate the key generation capability of
QKD between a ground station and a LEO satellite
(~ 300 km altitude) in one overhead passes
(duration ~ 8 minutes). Our objective will be to
produce multiple new crypto variables, each of
several hundred bits in length. We will assume that
the QKD transmitter (Alice) is at the ground
station and the receiver (Bob) is on the satellite.
(Similar arguments support the viability of
satellite-to-ground QKD transmissions, which
would have key rate and hardware advantages.)
We have designed our QKD system to operate at
a wavelength near 770 nm where the atmospheric
transmission from surface to space can be as high
as 80%. Furthermore, at optical wavelengths the
polarized QKD photons can be faithfully
transmitted because the depolarizing effects of
Faraday rotation in the ionosphere are negligible.
Because the atmosphere is only weakly dispersive,
a bright timing pulse (which carries no key
information) of ~ 100-ps duration can be used to
set a short time window (~ 1 ns) within which to
look for the QKD photon. A single QKD-photon
arriving ~ 100 ns after the bright pulse would
find that the satellite had moved by less than 1
mm.
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To estimate the rate at which QKD
photons would be detected at the satellite from
the ground station transmitter, we assume 20-cm
diameter optics at both the transmitter and satellite
receiver, leading to a ~ 1-m diameter diffractionlimited spot size at a 300-km altitude satellite.
However, there will be beam-wander owing to
atmospheric turbulence, which at night in a high
desert location such as Los Alamos can be 1 to 5
arc seconds.[27] For this analysis we assume a
worst case "seeing" of ~ 10 times the diffraction
limit (i.e. 10 arc seconds of wander) so that the
photon collection efficiency at the satellite is ~
10^-4 Thus, with a laser pulse rate of 10 MHz, one
photon-per-pulse on average, an atmospheric
transmission of ~ 80%, a 65% detector efficiency
and allowing for the 25% intrinsic efficiency of the
B92 QKD protocol, a key generation rate of ~250
Hz is feasible. (There would be a factor of two
higher key rates with the BB84 protocol.)
Higher key rates would be possible
under more typical seeing conditions. Also, with
a simple beam tilt feedback system, as used in
laser communications systems, the beam could be
locked onto the satellite, increasing the key rate
to ~ 40 kHz. A retro-reflector on the satellite
would return a portion of each bright pulse to the
transmitter with a ~ 2 ms delay, which is much
shorter than the time-scale of atmospheric
turbulence fluctuations. (From the ground, the
satellite would move through an angle of only ~
50 micro radians in this time.) It would also be
possible to place the QKD transmitter on the
satellite and the receiver on the ground. Because
most of the optical influence of atmospheric
turbulence would occur in the final ~ 2-km of the
beam path, a higher key rate would then be
possible even without tilt control.
To determine if this key rate is useful we must
also consider the error rate. We first consider
errors arising from background photons arriving at
the satellite on a nighttime orbit with a full moon
and under (poor) 10-arc second seeing conditions.
A typical radiance observed at the satellite at the
transmission
wavelength
would then
-2
15
-1 -2 be-1 ~-11mW
-1 -1
m str m or ~ 4x10
photons s m str m . We
will assume that the receiver “sees” a solid angle ~
five times the apparent size of the source (i.e. 5 arc
seconds) and that there is a 1-nm bandwidth
interference filter placed in front of the detector,
giving a background photon arrival rate of ~ 225
Hz (full moon). (For comparison, detector dark
counts would be ~ 50 Hz.) However, the single-



photon detector would only be triggered by
precursor bright pulses impinging on the satellite,
giving a detector trigger rate of ~ 90 kHz (without
beam tilt control). With a 1-ns time window
applied to the detector, the (fractional) bit error
rate (BER) from -5background photons would
therefore be ~ 5x10 (full moon). With beam tilt
control the fractional BER
from background
-5
photons would be ~ 4x10 . In practice, errors
from
optical
component
limitations and
misalignments will be larger, amounting to a 1 to 2
percent BER based on our experience.
From this simple analysis using worstcase estimates, we see that QKD between a ground
station and a low-earth orbit satellite should be
possible on nighttime orbits. During the several
minutes that a satellite would be in view of the
ground station there would be adequate time to
acquire the satellite, perform the QKD
transmissions for ~ 1 minute, and produce a
minimum of ~ 10,000 raw bits, from which a
shorter error-free key stream of several thousand
bits would be produced after error correction and
privacy amplification. Under more typical seeing
conditions5 or with beam tilt control implemented,
up to 10 key bits could be produced in the 1minute QKD transmission. A cryptographically
useful quantity of key material could therefore be
generated between a ground station and a LEO or
geostationary satellite using available technology.
(Satellite to satellite QKD transmissions would also
be possible.)
On daytime orbits the
background
radiance would be ~ 4,000 times larger (~
19

2x10

-1

-2

-1

-1

photons s m str m ) than under a full
-2

moon, but a narrow atomic vapor filter (~ 10
nm filter width) [28] would keep the background
photon arrival rate to only ~ 10 kHz. Assuming a
typical daytime seeing of 10 arc seconds,[27] the
key rate would be ~ 250 Hz, and the BER from
-3

background photons would then be ~ 2x10
(without tilt control). QKD is therefore also likely
to be possible on daytime orbits.
5. Summary and Conclusions
This
paper
presents
the
first
practical
demonstration that point-to-point free-space QKD
is feasible under daylight conditions outside a
laboratory, achieving a realistic propagation distance
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of 0.5 km that was only limited by the length of the
test range. We are now in the process of improving
the system and anticipate performing a 2-km
daylight demonstration early in 1999, possibly
increasing to 7 km later. Free-space QKD could
therefore be used in conjunction with terrestrial
laser communications systems that are now
commercially available. Our results also provide
strong evidence that cryptographic key material
could be generated on demand between a ground
station and a satellite (or between two satellites)
using QKD, allowing a satellite to be securely rekeyed on orbit.
The development of QKD for satellite
communications would represent a major step
forward in both security and convenience. If the
key material supplied at launch should be used up
during normal operations or compromised, an issue
arises of how to securely re-key a satellite on-orbit.
In contrast to conventional key distribution methods
whose security is based on assumptions of
computational complexity, QKD is a physics-based
technique and as such needs to be experimentally
validated under the conditions of its intended use.
To our knowledge the primary physics
requirements for this application of QKD, namely
the transmission and detection of single photons
between a ground station and an orbital asset, have
never been demonstrated. However, many of the
optical acquisition, pointing, and tracking and
adaptive optics techniques developed for laser
communications with satellites can be directly
applied to this problem. Therefore, we believe that a
surface-to-satellite QKD demonstration experiment
would be a logical and realistic next step in the
development of this new field. Furthermore, we
believe that the development of QKD for re-keying
of satellites on-orbit would be prudent, so as to
have an alternative to traditional key distribution
methods that can potentially become vulnerable to
unanticipated
algorithmic
or
computational
advances.
Satellite QKD could also be used to
provide secure key distribution to two groundbased users (Alice and Bob) who do not have
access to optical fiber communications and who
are not within line-of-sight: they could each
generate independent quantum keys with the same
satellite, which would then transmit the XOR of
the keys to Bob. Bob would then XOR this bit
string with his key to produce a key that agrees



with Alice’s. Alice and Bob could then use their
shared key for encrypted communications over any
convenient channel. This procedure could extend
the security and convenience of QKD to widely
separated ground-based users.
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